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Japanese Crimes in Nanjing,
1937-38 : A Reappraisal
Jean-Louis Margolin
“Robespierristes, anti-robespierristes,
nous vous crions grâce :
par pitié, dites-nous, simplement,
quel fut Robespierre”
1
Less politics, more history, please  !
1 For many Chinese worldwide, Nanjing is considered a tragedy of proportions equal only
to Hiroshima and Auschwitz
2
. Many Japanese still try hard, if not to completely deny
their army's crimes, at least to minimise them and to find excuses for them. Yet, and
with a reasonable degree of precision, the evidence, the process, the responsibilities
and the dimensions (including the fiercely argued about number of victims) of those
events are not too difficult to outline. No other single massacre in Asian history, and
few during World War II, including in Europe, have had so many testifying witnesses !
Foreign  academics  (including  professors  of sociology  and  history),  reporters,
missionaries,  diplomats  and businessmen,  all  familiar  with  writing  and with  China,
often fluent in Chinese, have provided us with a profusion of narratives, all the more
reliable as those writings came with or followed very closely the events. 
2 But the very centrality of Nanjing in the assessment of the whole 1937-45 war between
Japan and China has unfortunately led to much ideologically motivated obscuring, on
both  sides.  Strangely,  with  the  passing  of  time,  the  range  between  the  diverse
evaluations of victims has not narrowed, but widened (at the last count, between 50
and 430 000...
3
), some Japanese veterans, politicians and historians (but definitely not
the majority) still consider it a matter of honour and respect for their fallen soldiers to
deny either the facts, or the figures, or both ; and many Chinese (in China, and maybe
even more in the United States) consider it a matter of national pride to add new layers
to the amount of  victims.  Any attempt to discuss,  not  only the facts,  but  even the
official 300,000 figure (posted in bold on the wall of the Nanjing Massacre Memorial)
may trigger a diplomatic row. Historical research has been the loser : there has been no
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serious attempt to clarify other wartime massacres in China, such as in Wuhan in 1938,
or Changsha in 1944, and even less to make a comprehensive assessment of Japanese
crimes in China, outside the doubtful present official figure of 35 million violent deaths.
Comparing Nanjing with Singapore in 1942 (the infamous Sook Ching operation)
4
,  or
Manila in 1945, could prove very rewarding, but historicising an issue also means to
run  the  risk  of  trivialising  it,  and  turns  against  both  heroisation  and  damnation.
Nanjing could even be proved not to be the biggest Japanese massacre in China (for all
of Asia, Manila—itself very little studied—probably comes first).  Therefore, we don't
even  know  in  what  measure  Nanjing  has  been  the  exception  or  the  rule  in  the
behaviour of Japanese troops in China. 
3 A similar  magnifying effect  could be pointed to in the case of  Auschwitz.  It  is  still
considered as the emblematic crime scene of the Jewish genocide, even as we now know
that  the  number of  victims (probably  around 900,000)  represents  only  one-sixth of
Jewish  deaths,  and  is  only slightly  higher  than  the  figure  for  Treblinka  (around
800,000). That can be explained by the survival, despite terrible ordeals, of a number of
witnesses at Auschwitz, although almost every Jew was killed on arrival in Treblinka.
We should at least consider the possibility of a similar effect for Nanjing. 
4 There is a great difference, however, at least,  at present.  The number of Auschwitz
deaths has been reassessed many times (and is still not finalised), from an initial figure
of four million (the official figure in communist Poland) to less than a million. But these
reassessments  have  largely  been  made  by  Jewish  historians,  without  major
controversies,  without accusations of  revisionism, and without political  implication.
Outside  a  vocal  but  quite  insignificant  fringe  of  deniers,  totally  discredited (except
maybe in a few East European countries) academically and politically, consensus exists
regarding  the  essential  features  and  dimensions  of  Nazi  crimes.  German historians
themselves play an essential—and now uncontroversial—role in the advancement of
our  knowledge  on  the  Shoah.  There  are  still  grey  areas  and  areas  of  controversy,
occasionally  bitter,  but  they  concern  essentially  details  (chronology,  personalities,
organisations, local history...)  and interpretations
5
.  The situation is very different in
Asia.
5 This  paper  will  present  a  reassessment  of  the  tragic  first  weeks  that  followed  the
Japanese  occupation  of  the  then  Chinese  capital,  on  December  13th  1937
6
.  It  will
concentrate on the points of greatest contention, and use mostly data from Western
7
and Japanese
8
 witnesses or perpetrators. Reliable Chinese sources are less obvious, but
official wartime publications
9
 and the collection of testimonies painstakingly gathered
since the 1970s by Honda Katsuichi
10
 are of some help.
How ?
6 Chinese people living in Nanjing between December 1937 and February 1938 (when a
degree of normalcy started to be restored) could rightly have had the feeling of living
in a pandemonium of violence and cruelty in which an army of monsters did all they
could to make their existence as miserable as possible—when they did not kill them
outright.
The violence of war
7 Nevertheless,  what  happened  was  not  indiscriminate  or  senseless  violence.  It  is
essential that we differentiate here between three different types of mass violence, as
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the circumstances and consequences differed widely. The first could be called a “war
massacre”.  For  the  Japanese  troops  who had suffered huge  losses  in  the  battle  for
Shanghai (August-November), taking over Nanjing proved easy, and their losses were
small (around 1,000 deaths). Things were completely different for the Chinese. Chiang
Kai-shek, as late as December 11th, had ordered a defensive position to be taken behind
Nanjing’s thick walls, the gates of which had almost all been blocked. But on December
12th, he ordered an immediate retreat, before any significant Japanese attack. An awful
panic followed, as many officers left their men behind while they themselves fled the
fighting, and as uninformed units started shooting at the “deserters”. The city had been
almost completely encircled by the Japanese, and the only obvious way out was towards
the Yangzijiang that had then to be crossed. Thousands died : crushed to death trying
to cross the only narrow gate, falling from the city walls, drowning in the icy water
when  their  overcharged  embarkations  capsized  or  when  they  attempted  to  swim
across, or killed by their own troops. 
8 Many more, probably, were killed by fire from the Japanese flotilla, already positioned
on the river. The fighting was then completely one-sided, as the Chinese had almost no
means and even less will to counterattack. Nevertheless, as the Nanjing garrison had
refused  to  surrender  on  December  10th,  to  the  duly  transmitted  ultimatum of  the
Japanese army, the massacre contradicted not at all the accepted laws of war. What
army ever failed to take full advantage of a similar disequilibrium, the last case to date
being probably the destruction by the US Air Force of the Iraqi army retreating from
Kuwait in 1991 ?
The extermination of Chinese soldiers
9 But what happened next was totally contrary to the age-old and universally accepted
laws and customs of war, and, particularly, to the 1929 Geneva Convention on Prisoners
of  War,  signed  but  not  ratified  by  Japan
11
.  Seen  by  Japanese  Headquarters,  it  was
probably a follow-up of a battle that should have led to the total crushing of Chiang’s
forces. But the most extensive crime (by universal morality, by international law) that
took  place  in  (or,  more  precisely,  around)  Nanjing  was  the  systematic  massacre  of
unarmed  Chinese  soldiers.  Most  had  surrendered,  frequently  in  whole  units,  quite
confidently :  some  of  their  Japanese  guards  remarked  that  they  would  have  been
crushed in no time if  those masses of prisoners, sometimes not fully disarmed, had
turned unruly.  Some Japanese,  afterwards,  talked  about  the  numerous  plainclothes
soldiers they also arrested as if discarding their uniform had been sufficient reason to
kill  them.  In  any  case  the  argument  is  very  poor :  the  uniformed  soldiers  who
surrendered, were treated as badly as those in plain clothes, who had tried to blend
into the civilian population. It could even be argued that, if they had not been given
good reason to fear for their lives, most would not had tried to hide.
10 The massacre was cold-blooded and deliberate. It lasted several weeks, even if most
were killed in the first few days :  as late as January, several thousand "plainclothes
soldiers" were still arrested to be executed. Few of the trapped soldiers had a chance to
escape death. Even inside the Safety Zone, refugee camps were combed again and again,
and all Chinese had to register from December 26th : according to Rabe, that led to
some 20,000 arrests
12
. All men of fighting age were closely scrutinised. A military-style
haircut,  a  paler  forehead (soldiers  wear headgear),  a  red mark on the rifle-bearing
shoulder meant sure death. Thousands of male civilians in the 15 to 45 age group (not
very  numerous,  many  had  left  the  town  without  their  families)  were  taken,  as  it
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appeared to many officers in charge so much easier to arrest everybody that could have
been a  soldier,  according to  the  principle :  "better  ten innocents  dead than an ex-
soldier free". Significantly, on the evening of December 13th, the 6th Brigade of the 9th
Division issued the directive : "Since the defeated enemy soldiers are believed to be in
plainclothes, you must arrest any person who is suspected of being so and detain him at
an appropriate location (...) You should regard every adult man up to middle age as a
straggling  or  plainclothes  soldier,  and  arrest  and  detain  him"
13
.  Regarding  the
execution orders, most were probably transmitted orally, or written in the ambiguous
way common to all planners of “final solutions”. But a few very explicit directives have
emerged, such as the regimental order received on December 13th by the 1st Battalion
of the 66th Infantry Regiment, 114th Division : “Execute all the prisoners in accordance
with  the  brigade's  order.  Regarding  the  method for  execution,  what  about  making
groups of dozens each, tying them up, and shooting them one by one ?”
14
. 
11 Such a modus operandi appears quite typical. What mattered was speed and efficiency.
The surprise factor was essential. A number of prisoners of war (POWs) were bayoneted
or decapitated with swords—that was great fun for several soldiers, and good training
according to their officers—, but it was much faster and more practical, considering the
immensity of the task, to mow down big groups with the concentrated fire of several
machine guns, then to burn the bodies using gasoline. Several Chinese soldiers went
through the ordeal, without being killed, hence our abundant knowledge on that point.
Everywhere the targets, the processing and the results were more or less the same,
whatever the Japanese army unit, the date, or the previous behaviour of the POWs. No
significant numbers ever escaped death to be sent to a prisoner camp or to be released.
The luckiest could be selected as coolies by a Japanese army chronically deficient in
logistics. Yet even those men frequently ended by being murdered, being no longer
needed. General Staff officer Sakakibara confided his disappointment :  "I planned to
use the interned prisoners as labour in Shanghai, but they were killed while I was away
on an official trip"
15
. To the best of our knowledge, no Japanese soldier was punished, at
least during that period, for such misdeeds.
12 The  goal  was  to  win  the  war,  but  also  to  destroy  the  basis  of  the  Guomindang
government. Thus every government employee was considered as an enemy. More than
fifty  of  the  400  policemen "given"  by  the  former  municipality  to  the  International
Committee (IC) were arrested and murdered, as well as a handful of street sweepers,
and  43  of  the  54  employees  who had  remained  at  their  post  in  the  electric  plant,
actually belonging to the private sector, had been mistakenly treated as government
employees.
The multiple violence against civilians
13 The third and last category of violence struck people as civilians, and not (as for the
young men) as would-be soldiers. This was more pervasive and lasted longer, but was
less systematic and less deadly. It is divided into three sub-categories. The countless
rapes (8,000 to 20,000,  according to Western witnesses) were the main cause of the
terror in which refugees passed those months. Taking women within the main target
age range (say, between 15 and 40) and numbering to a maximum of 50,000 (see second
part for the population figures),  and also taking into account the frequent multiple
rapes that many of them suffered, it can safely be deduced that, in the space of about
two months, a huge portion of that age group (most probably between 10% and 30%)
were  victims  of  sex  crimes.  Some  days  (or  more  precisely  nights)  of  December,
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according to IC members, upwards of 1,000 women were raped. Few women could feel
safe :  on the  university  campus alone,  the  youngest  victim was  nine years  old,  the
oldest seventy-six. 
14 Several circumstantial factors worsened the ordeal : soldiers generally acted in small
groups, and thus most rapes seem to have been collective ; they often took place in full
view of other women refugees, less often in front of the terrified families ; women were
frequently kidnapped, to places where the soldiers were housed, and released only the
next morning, or sometimes after a few days or weeks—in such cases they could be
used  as  servants  during  the  day,  as  sex  slaves  at  night ;  violence  (often  using  the
ubiquitous bayonet) was the rule when the victim or her relatives resisted, and murder
was not the exception, even if it remained infrequent
16
. In a number of cases, women
were incited or forced into prostitution : the “Comfort Women” system, so extensive
later on, seem to have had its origin in Nanjing. 
15 We have just  mentioned the murder  of  family  members  (or  friends  or  neighbours)
during rapes. More generally, the slightest unwillingness to let Japanese soldiers go
their way, the slightest reluctance to follow their orders (generally given in Japanese,
sometimes in broken Chinese...) and any attempt to hide or flee could lead easily to
death : according to Reverend John Magee, of the IC, Japanese soldiers “not only killed
every prisoner they could find but also a vast number of ordinary citizens of all age.
Many of them were shot down like the hunting of rabbits in the streets. There are dead
bodies all over the city
17
 (...). So many of the Chinese are timid and when challenged
foolishly start to run. This is what happened to that man (...) These two Jap. soldiers
were no more concerned than if they had been killing a rat and never stopped smoking
their cigarettes and talking and laughing”
18
. These almost random murders form the
second sub-group of violence against civilians. The most thorough investigation into
these was made after March 1938 by a sociologist of Nanjing University and IC member,
Lewis  S.C.  Smythe,  assisted  by  some  twenty  students.  The  data  for  the  villages  of
Jiangning  xian,  close  to  Nanjing,  are  very  revealing.  Among  the  9,160  recorded
murders, males represent more than three-quarters. 59% of them belong to the 15-44
age group, targeted as possible soldiers, but only 11% of female deaths belong to the
same group—the one most targeted for rapes—, 83% being 45 or above (and 39% over
60).  That  seems  to  confirm  what  many  individual  cases  show :  older  people,  and
especially older women, whose families thought that they had a better chance of being
respected by the Japanese, remained in the house or the shop to try and preserve it,
when the rest of the family went into hiding, or into the refugee camps of the Safety
Zone. Yet the soldiers seldom spared them during their looting and arson expeditions,
many being burned alive in their own houses. Numerous mothers and grandmothers
perished trying to stop their daughters'/granddaughters' rape. Many individual stories
seem to indicate that, during the rapes, family members were more often killed than
the raped girl. The last important information in Smythe's data concerns children : the
age group 5-14 years represents 8% of the deaths (slightly more for boys than for girls),
and the 0-4 years about 2%. The Japanese were not compulsive baby-killers
19
.
16 The  third  and  last  sub-group  of  anti-civilian  violence  is  made  up  of  the  extensive
looting, arson and destruction by fire that made life almost impossible in the parts of
town not included in the Safety Zone. In a city that had been little damaged by the
effects  of  war  itself,  about  one  third  of  the  buildings  were  partly  or  completely
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destroyed,  over several  weeks,  and in a very systematic way.  People were robbed—
including of the few things and the little food they had taken with them to the refugee
camps—, but the worst was the thorough plundering of the shops, row after row, and
the  subsequent  fires.  They  could  not  be  protected  by  the  IC,  as  the  Zone  mostly
included  administrative,  educational  and  medical  buildings.  It  was  well  organised :
officers  were  leading  their  men in  those  inglorious  expeditions ;  whole  convoys  of
trucks then removed the looted items. The highest ranking officers felt no shame in
grabbing their (choice) share of the plunder : Lieutenant General Nakajima Kesago—
former head of the Military Police, the dreaded Kempeitai—replied to his commander-
in-chief, General Matsui Iwane, who was blaming his greed : “Why does the stealing of
art  pieces matter so much when we are stealing a country and human lives ?  Who
would benefit from these items even if we left them behind ?”
20
. Outside its cynicism,
that answer says something about the true intentions of the Japanese (or maybe only of
some  Japanese ?) :  certainly  not  a  genocide  of  the  Chinese  population,  but  its
impoverishment,  the  disintegration  of  the  society,  the  destruction  of  political
structures, the deterioration of culture
21
.  All that goes well with the initial Japanese
attempt to divide China into as many fragments as possible (that policy was reversed in
1939-1940,  due  to  the  unexpected  persistence  of  Chinese  resistance),  and  with  the
frightening development of  drug pushing and consumption,  that  so alarmed the IC
members as early as the spring of 1938. 
How many ?
17 The  body  count  should  have  remained  a  secondary  issue :  the  evidence  is
overwhelming, and scientifically undeniable, of large-scale massacres in Nanjing. And
there is also sufficient evidence to show that the killing of the POWs was systematic as
well as organised according to military hierarchy, sufficient evidence too of the general
acceptance (if  not participation) of the army leaders regarding the violence against
civilians. That knowledge is not recent : it provided the basis of the verdict of death
returned against General Matsui, in 1948.
18 But  so  much smoke  has  blurred  the  legitimate  scientific  debate  on  the  number  of
victims that a reappraisal of that question is unavoidable. The issue is not an easy one,
as the "bottom line" is the aggregate of several mass murders among different target
groups : the POWs, the civilians arrested as plainclothes soldiers, the raped women and
their  families  or  friends,  not  to  forget  the "random" or  "accidental"  killings,  often
connected  to  looting  and  arson.  The  difficulty  is  such  that  a  number  of  authors,
following the questionable methods used during the Tokyo Trial,  have tried to find
"shortcuts" towards the truth. But, in our opinion, these shortcuts lead nowhere. 
Two wrong ways towards the truth
19 The seemingly easiest way could be the inventory and detailed evaluation of all large-
scale killing :  no-one contests that most deaths took place during mass murders,  in
Nanjing  or,  more  frequently,  in  its  vicinity.  A  number  of  documents  (records  of
Japanese army units, Japanese soldiers' diaries, oral testimonies or affidavits by Chinese
survivors or witnesses, diaries and letters of Westerners from Nanjing, etc) give fairly
precise  figures  on  probably  all the  mass  executions.  The  troubles  start  with  the
enumeration of these events : they took place over a few days, in a reduced space, and
consequently  it  is  often  almost  impossible  to  decide  if  two  different  sources  are
describing  two  different  massacres  or  one  and  the  same,  with  a  slightly  different
timetable and/or location. The problem is all the more serious when these two sources
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each talk of the killing of about 50,000 people…
22
. The troubles develop further with the
assessment of each massacre. In face of a crowd, the spontaneous tendency always is to
overestimate it (everyone should do the experience of counting it afterwards, at least
once in one's life).  Under the awful stress of a mass killing, one can guess that the
overestimation must be even more pronounced. Quite obviously the escaped victims,
lying until dark under piles of dead bodies, generally injured themselves, were in no
position to provide an accurate or perhaps even reliable figure.  The Japanese units
were overwhelmed by the huge numbers of prisoners, and by the insistence of their
hierarchy on disposing of them as soon as possible. At least for the biggest massacres
(those  over,  say,  2,000  people),  it  is  quite  obvious  that  they  did  not  count  them
seriously. Furthermore it should be remembered that they were not specialised units,
such  as  the  SS  in  the  German  army,  and  that  mere  opportunism  led  them  to
overestimate the number of victims. Consequently that method is unable to produce
solid numbers. Furthermore the mistake is to tend to overestimates. 
20 Another  method,  that  could  be  more  reliable—to  which  the  Tokyo  International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) gave its seal of approval—, is based on burial
data.  Very detailed records have been kept,  especially of the Chinese Red Swastika,
which  was  working  in  close  co-operation  with  the  IC  who  provided  part  of  the
financing.  That  organisation  gave  a  final  resting  place  to  42,000  bodies  between
December 1937 and April 1938. That figure may be accepted, and it is quite certain that,
in such a period, it corresponds to an overwhelming majority of violent deaths. But
that  does  not  mean in  any way that  the  Japanese  murdered something like  40,000
people. In fact, to that figure should be added the unknown but large number of bodies
thrown into the wide Yangzijiang (most mass killings took place on its banks) ;  and
from it should be subtracted an equally unknown but large number of bodies of Chinese
soldiers who actually died during the fighting (not necessarily killed by the Japanese, as
explained previously), and who cannot be considered to have been murdered. The coup
de grâce is given by the impossibility to know what percentage of the abandoned bodies
the Red Swastika did bury. Families and neighbourhoods, for sure, did their part : their
most active period, according to Red Swastika data, was in February, two months after
the worst killings. The Japanese had given in December the awkward order to leave the
bodies where they were, including in front of houses, even in the Safety Zone, and that
order  seems  not  to  have  been  lifted  before  the  end  of  January
23
.  But,  for  obvious
reasons, people must have tried to dispose of the decaying bodies as soon as possible.
The problem is made even more complicated by the belated release (actually after war
ended)  of  the  burial  statistics  of  another  charitable  society,  the  Buddhist
Chunshantang. Never evoked by the IC members, it nevertheless claims to have buried
112,000 bodies. The figure appears utterly unreliable : it was only a small group (forty
full-time workers),  and would have buried almost 4400 bodies a day during the last
three weeks of April  ! Why would the Red Swastika have left its job so unfinished (its
activity  slackened after  the first  week of  March) ?  How to explain that,  after  some
normality  returned  from  mid-February,  both  the  Japanese  garrison  and  the  new
municipal authorities could have borne leaving a mass of 100,000 bodies decaying for
two more months, at the start of the warm season, just outside Nanjing ? Consequently,
we can safely dismiss Chunshantang statistics as fabricated, but that does not imply
that  they  (or  some other  societies,  or  individuals)  did  absolutely  nothing.  The  end
result : the burial statistics are too unreliable to be the basis of an evaluation.
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The problem of the remaining civilian population
21 So we are back to square one. The first two figures to obtain should be those of the two
populations  concerned  by  the  killings :  the  remaining  civilian  population,  and  the
trapped Chinese soldiers.
22 It should not be too difficult to estimate the number of civilians. Everybody agrees that,
at  the beginning of  the war,  Nanjing was inhabited by roughly one million people.
Everybody (municipality, IC members, reporters...), during the events and in the years
following, agreed too on the population remaining in December 1937 : a maximum of
250,000, 90% (or more) having taken refuge in the Safety Zone. It is very important to
stress that the figure had been given before the entry of the Japanese troops : Iris Chang
and most Chinese authors agree that a few days later, indeed only a quarter of a million
remained, but they claim that on December 13th the population was still 500,000 to
600,000
24
, the balance corresponding to the massacred civilians. But, in Rabe's diary we
can  find  that,  as  early  as  November  28th,  “Wang  Kopang,  the  chief  of  police,  has
repeatedly declared that 200,000 Chinese are still living in the city"
25
. Similar figures
were given by the New York Times (November 22nd) and Newsweek (December 6th)—both
then had reporters in Nanjing.
23 Such an exodus should not look unbelievable. Chiang Kai-shek had decided as early as
November 19th to leave the capital, and the whole Guomindang central administration
had left weeks before the arrival of the Japanese. A lot of people had every incentive
not  to  stay,  and the  means  to  move.  Only  the  poorest  and less  politically  engaged
people  remained behind.  Many Chinese localities,  big  or  small,  had lost  even more
people  in  similar  circumstances,  so  great  was  the  (justified)  fear  inspired  by  the
Japanese : thus the November 20th issue of the Asahi Shimbun spots only 500 residents
remaining in the large city of Suzhou to "welcome" the Imperial Army
26
. In France, in
May-June 1940, ten million people (one-quarter of the total population, much more in
the northern areas) abandoned their homes, although the German army behaved then
far better than the Japanese in China.
The problem of the remaining—and killed—Chinese soldiers
24 The second figure is  more difficult  to establish,  but absolutely decisive :  as we may
assume that almost all Chinese soldiers arrested by the Japanese were executed, the
number of soldiers remaining in Nanjing on the evening of December 13th is very close
to the number of POW murders. Only a few hundred, or more probably a few thousand,
were able to hide long enough to safely leave the city when it started to reopen in
February.  Five  component  numbers  have  to  be  assessed.  The  most  important  is
probably the total strength of the Nanjing Chinese garrison. It included 13 divisions,
plus some artillery and military police units. At full strength that would have meant
about 180,000 soldiers. But many of these units had been severely depleted during the
Shanghai  battle,  and  desertions  were  rampant.  Yamamoto,  after  very  thorough
discussion, proposes a range of 80,000 to 130,000 soldiers, just before the final battle for
Nanjing
27
.  On  that  point,  there  is  no  disagreement  with  Iris  Chang  and  the  other
authors.
25 The next figure is the number of combat losses (the “war massacre” already described).
Several authors have estimated this at a minimum of 10,000. The third is the end result
of  the  mentioned  panic :  at  the  very  least  one  thousand,  more  probably  several
thousand.  The  utter  disorganisation  during  the  last  days  was  also  cause  for  the
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abandoning of the sick and injured soldiers, without or almost without medical care, in
the hospitals or at the railway station
28
. Some days in November, up to 1,700 arrived in
Nanjing, and many died therefore before or just after the arrival of the Japanese, to an
estimate of around 9,000
29
.  Finally, those who could safely cross the river should be
numbered―at least a few thousand, probably more (a number fled early on).
26 Consequently, a rough, but rather conservative estimation could be :
• – 25,000 soldiers killed during the battle, in the panic, or dead from lack of medical care ;
• – 10,000 retreating safely ;
• – 5,000 hiding successfully in or around Nanjing.
27 Subtracting these from the original strength (probably a maximum of 100,000 men on
December 12th—Chang says 90,000),  it  means that possibly 60,000 soldiers,  but more
probably less, and a bare minimum of 30,000 were captured by the Japanese, and killed.
Most were executed between December 12th and 18th : similarly to a Srebrenica (where
7,000 Bosnian Muslims were murdered by Serbs in 1995) per day during one week.
The killed civilians
28 The big controversy concerns civilian deaths. Of course they could not possibly be more
numerous than the number of inhabitants on December 13th. But we have also seen
that there has been no wholesale killing, no genocide. In the thousands pages of diaries,
letters,  reports,  dispatches,  articles,  there  is  not  the  slightest  hint  of  a  systematic
attempt to make the Nanjing population disappear. The only exception were the young
males, often mixed with the soldiers, and treated like them. Not surprisingly, in the
available data (especially Smythe's), they form a clear majority of civilian deaths, even
as there were many more females than males among those remaining. There is detailed
information on 6,600 violent  deaths  and abductions  of  males  inside  the city :  4,200
abductions  and 1,100  killings  were  committed  against  the  age  group 15  to  44.  The
women (all ages) killed numbered 650
30
.  We have already looked at the data for the
vicinity of Nanjing : they present similar trends, even if the proportions of females and,
among the males, of the other age groups are significantly higher : these differences
probably demonstrate that the IC was efficient at protecting the civilians, except those
regarded as possible soldiers. So, of a total of almost 16,500 detailed murders, in and
around the city, males aged 15-44 make up about 9,500 (or 57%). All females make up
about 2,500, or 15%. 
29 These statistics are entirely compatible with the qualitative indications one draws from
the available documents. They also fit well with the burial statistics : the Red Swastika
buried  208  men,  but  only  75  women,  and  20  children. The  Chunshantang  data,  in
whatever value we may give to them, include 97% male bodies ; 2% women's, and less
than  1%  children
31
.  Nothing  surprising  there,  if  we  accept  that  the  overwhelming
majority  of  the victims were soldiers  and,  among the civilians,  men,  most  of  them
selectively arrested as would-be soldiers. The extremely small proportion of women
and children among the bodies is also logical, if we accept that women or children were
almost always killed individually, sometimes in the streets, more often during rapes
and lootings, generally in the presence of or not far away from their families, friends or
neighbours :  their  bodies  were  usually  buried  by  those  people,  and  escaped  the
collected  statistics.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  no  trace  in  all  these  data  (including,
ironically, in the much contested Chunshantang's data) of any large-scale massacre of
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civilians, outside the young adult males. There is especially no evidence that women or
children were killed in large numbers, as Chang and so many authors claim.
30 Miner  Bates—the  Nanjing  University  historian,  and  IC  member—sums  up  Smythe's
enquiries (having taken part in them) : "Our final estimate of the number of civilians
killed in Nanking was 12,000, nine-tenths apart from military operations, and including
many women, children, and aged men. That figure is in the ratio of one to every four
families then in the city"
32
. Eight years later, appearing as an accusation witness during
the Tokyo trial,  Bates saw no reason to change his  mind :  “Professor Smythe and I
concluded, as a result of our investigations and observations and checking of burials,
that twelve thousand civilians, men, women and children, were killed inside the walls
within our own sure knowledge. There were many others killed within the city outside
our knowledge whose numbers we have no way of checking, and also there were large
numbers killed immediately outside the city, of civilians”
33
. That last statement implies
that  12,000  should  be  regarded  as  a  minimum  more  than  as  a  “final  estimate”.
Nevertheless, if Bates could have imagined a final figure very significantly higher than
his original one, he would not have stuck to it, especially as he was in Tokyo on the
prosecution side. We do not know any convincing new evidence that should lead to the
dismissal  of  these very important  initial  investigations,  made by a  group of  people
academically trained, constantly present and in charge (management, feeding, medical
care, and of course protection) of the Nanjing population. It seems unbelievable that a
large-scale  massacre  among that  population  could  have  fully  escaped every  one  of
them : even the killing of soldiers (who were not under their responsibility) outside the
city walls were by and large known to them, or through survivors reaching the Zone, or
through the burial operations of the Red Swastika. 
31 Thus one may conclude, with a reasonable degree of safety, that between 12,000 and,
say,  20,000  civilians  were  murdered  inside  the  walls  of  Nanjing. If  the  immediate
vicinity is included, the number could jump to 30,000, or a bit more. That means huge
mass murder : 5% to 8% of the remaining population of the city proper (1.2% to 2% if
the pre-war population is considered), or one family in four, as an average, having lost
one  of  its  members
34
.  As a  comparison,  the  "Bloody  Week"  that  ended  the  Paris
Commune in 1871 killed less than 1% of the Parisians―and it is still remembered as a
major tragedy in French history, and struck the world at that time. Among the capital
cities of World War II, Nanjing could only be compared to Manila and Warsaw (plus
Amsterdam,  Budapest,  Vilnius,  Riga  and  Berlin  if  the  local  Jewish  populations
transported  to  the  death  camps  are  included)  for  the  percentage  of  its  citizens
deliberately murdered. And if we add the massacre of civilians to the "holocaust" of the
POWs, we reach the 50,000-90,000 range, about 95% of them men
35
.
Why ?
36
Nor a mere breakdown of discipline, nor a genocidal policy
32 Two  common—and  opposite—interpretations  should  be  rejected  first.  The  first  has
already  been  addressed :  a  "breakdown  of  discipline",  a  more  or  less  spontaneous
rampage by Japanese soldiers gone half mad with suffering and privation, and eager to
take revenge on the Chinese who had inflicted on them serious losses (40,000, including
9,000  killed  in  action)  during  the  Shanghai  battle.  It  is  the  preserve  of  Japanese
revisionists
37
, but it is also shared, in a lower key, by many authors. However, if things
had been so, one can wonder why massacres such as Nanjing, or worse, did not happen
even  much  more  frequently  in  war  history.  Furthermore,  such  an  interpretation
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contradicts the numerous evidences showing that the killing of the POWs had been
centrally organised, that officers of all ranks, as well as political leaders in Tokyo, were
perfectly and early informed of the atmosphere of terror developing in Nanjing, and
that, until February, they had not given a dime about it. Field officers―not the last to
take part  to  rapes  and lootings―were extremely  lenient  with all  kind of  atrocities
against civilians, even as the slightest lack of respect towards superiors or mistakes in
training or in war were punished with extreme severity.
33 Completely to the contrary, many authors refuse to make the distinction between the
behaviour towards the POWs and towards the civilians, and consider that the goal of
the Japanese, from the General Staff all the way down to enlisted men, was to kill and to
rape as many Chinese as possible, men, women and children. Even if the word is more
often suggested than pronounced, we are clearly facing a genocidal policy, according to
them—first and foremost Iris Chang. If  we follow her, the whole civilian population
would have been massacred, if the IC members had not been so brave. Brave they were,
indeed, and they saved many Chinese from murder, and even more from rape. But,
from their own sad admission, they were almost completely unable to do anything for
the soldiers or the young males arrested, even in their presence, in their own refugee
camps, and even as they knew that they were taken away to be killed. Conversely, they
were allowed to take efficient counter-measures against rapes and random violence
(such as regrouping in closed halls huge groups of women, the youngest and prettiest
staying as far as possible from the gates) ; they were allocated a few consular guards by
the Japanese embassy, who stopped some soldiers ; even alone, they were almost always
able to chase away the marauding groups of soldiers (Rabe putting proudly under their
nose his Nazi swastika armband...),  and even, not infrequently, to stop rapes in the
middle  of  the  act.  And,  to  their  own surprise,  in  these  feats,  none  were  killed,  or
seriously injured.  Therefore,  we can be certain that,  for the Chinese soldiers,  there
were  execution  orders,  that  a  disciplined  army  such  as  the  Japanese  accomplishes
inflexibly.  However,  for the civilians,  we have individual,  unorganised actions,  fully
tolerated by the military hierarchy, but in which the perpetrators acted alone, without
any cover from their superiors. It is also quite obvious that the soldiers had been given
very strict instructions never to attack, or even counter-attack the Westerners : being
American or German, they belonged to countries most important for Japan's external
relations. Otherwise, how to explain such a difference of treatment between the easily
brutalised or killed Chinese, and themselves ? Even drunk, even at the utmost of sexual
excitation, no Japanese soldier ever forgot those instructions.
The three temporalities of Japanese violent behaviour
34 Back to square one, once again ? Not completely : there are elements of pertinence in
both rejected interpretations. For us, Japanese behaviour in Nanjing is tri-dimensional.
Like Russian dolls, these three (temporal) dimensions are embedded one into the other.
The shortest period has already been hinted at. Matsui, close to retirement (that was to
be his last campaign), and not without bitter enemies at the Tokyo Headquarters as
well  as  among his  subordinates  (Nakajima especially),  wanted  a  short  and decisive
campaign that  would  terminate  the  war  in  a  few months.  He  imposed on Tokyo a
lightning  offensive  against  the  Chinese  capital,  defended by  many of  Chiang's  best
remaining troops. Contrary to expectations, there was to be no opportunity to kill them
on the battlefield. As the Japanese had no logistics for POWs, the temptation was too
great  to  solve  the  problem  by  finishing  them  off  after  the  battle...  A  secondary
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advantage could be to trigger that way, through terror, mass desertions in what was
left of the Chinese army. And, on that issue, Matsui was sure to receive Nakajima's full
support. For the atrocities against civilians, the explanation is different. The Japanese
were also operating according to highly deficient logistics, and had exacted much from
their soldiers. The officers found expedient to present to their men the juicy carrot of
food and women aplenty―the most praiseworthy units being granted the privilege of
entering cities first. They already had the experience of living in the country, and their
crossing of the 270km between Shanghai and Nanjing was a succession of killing, rape
and looting. Hence the criminal laxity observed in the capital. There too, there was a
secondary advantage : terrorising the population of a symbolic city could show other
Chinese  their  place  and  end  their  "arrogance",  so  often  damned  by  Japanese
propaganda.  Similarly  in Russia  in 1941,  the Germans felt  confident  in  a  rapid and
decisive victory, and it was then that their violence had been at its worst, especially
against  Soviet  POWs.  Contrary  to  popular  wisdom,  supremely  confident  people  can
behave much worse than desperate ones. 
35 That  brings  us  to  our  second  dimension,  the  medium  period.  It  is  difficult―and
somewhat vain―to decide if  Japan has been "fascist" or not.  But everybody should
agree that, in the late 1930s, the country was drifting fast towards the model presented
by  Italy  and  Germany,  and  that  totalitarian,  militarist,  ultra-nationalist  tendencies
were  strengthening  by  the  day.  We  know that  totalitarian  regimes  have  a  specific
conception  of  war  (parallel  to  their  conception  of  politics).  The  victory  should  be
absolute, the opponent country disappearing completely, or being transformed into a
kind of colony. Obviously, that kind of fighting to the death tends to lead to an orgy of
violence. And even (as in Italy or Japan) where racism was not central in state ideology,
the radicality and bitterness of enmity necessarily gave birth to a “secondary racism”,
used as self-justification for the worst atrocities. That could explain why Japan, during
World War II, behaved so much worse than during its previous armed conflicts (even if
the tendency to treat Westerners better than Asians is an old one : during the Meiji
period, Russians POWs were very correctly treated in 1905, but a cold-blooded massacre
of Chinese had taken place when Port-Arthur was taken over, in November 1894). 
36 The third dimension is the most long-term. Nanjing’s massacres should be related to
Japanese “war culture”. That relatively new approach has been developed mostly by
the American historian George L.  Mosse
38
 and by a  dynamic  team of  young French
historians (Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, Annette Becker, etc.). Both have concentrated
on World War I. The "war culture" approach draws heavily from sociology, ethnology
and even archaeology. There is a degree of convergence with “history from below”,
mostly Anglo-Saxon. Emphasised are soldier's training, life, environment (including the
“primary group” of army mates), fighting habits ; the ideological/political mobilisation
of the civilians ; the representations of friend and foe, of the nation, of the “glorious
dead”, etc. To our knowledge, little has been done in that field regarding the Japanese
army
39
. But it would prove fascinating. We already know that training and daily life in
the  barracks,  even  in  peacetime,  were  awfully  sordid  and  violent  (“training  by
slapping”).  Especially  since  the  early  1930s,  a  mysticism of  the  “new samurai”  had
developed, with a fascination for the sword and the bayonet, and absolute contempt for
surrender  or  “humanitarian”  considerations.  The  group  spirit,  reinforced  by  the
recruitment of units on a local basis, led to many feuds inside the army itself, but at
war  it  may  have  given  birth  to  the  gangs  of  marauders  that  roamed  Nanjing.
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Individually, the Japanese soldier seems to have been able to pass quite frequently from
an  extreme  insensitivity  to  unexpected  bouts  of  lachrymal  sentimentality,  for
themselves but also, sometimes, for their enemies. 
37 Finally, the study of the image of the enemy (sketched by John Dower for the Pacific
War
40
) in the China War could be rewarding. According to their diaries and letters, the
Japanese soldiers felt offended by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Chinese :
they should have behaved according to their image of weaklings, cowards, easy-to-beat
soldiers (from the experience of the 1894-95 war). If they had not, it was not because
their  image  was  wrong ;  but  was  due  to  their  hard-to-believe  perfidy,  to  their
maliciousness  and  their  undeserved  arrogance  towards  the  Japanese.  Private  Ueba
writes in his diary : “How can the Chinese keep fighting even with all that damage ! I
hate them”
41
. Stunningly, Omer Bartov describes exactly the same reaction among the
German soldiers facing Russian resistance from 1941—and it led them to an upsurge of
racial  hatred and violence
42
.  In  both cases,  a  terrible  revenge had to be taken.  The
enemy had forfeited every right by its lack of respect for the role that had been written
for it
43
.
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1.“Robespierrists, anti-robespierrists, we ask for mercy : have pity, merely tell us who
Robespierre actually was”. Marc Bloch (1886-1944), Apologie pour l'histoire ou métier
d'historien, Paris, Armand Colin, 1949.
2.The most widely read book on the subject : Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking, New York,
Basic Books, 1997, is subtitled The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II.
3.Tanaka Masaaki (former secretary of General Matsui Iwane) on one side, Chinese
military specialist Liu Fang-chu on the other.
4. “Epuration” in Hokkien dialect.
5.Another thought-provoking case could be the bombardment by British planes of
Dresden, in Germany, in February 1945. Its victims had been estimated at 135,000 by
most Western historians, at 300,000 officially in East Germany, at 400,000 or even more
by some West German historians. Recent historical research by German historians has
reduced the figure to around 35,000.
6. This article has been prepared as a side product of a (hopefully) comprehensive book
on Japanese war crimes due to be published (in French) by Armand Colin Editions, in
2006.
7.An extensive collection of the American missionaries’ Nanjing papers has been
published by Zhang Kaiyuan : Eyewitnesses to Massacre : American Missionaries Bear Witness
to Japanese Atrocities in Nanjing, Armonk (N. Y.), East Gate Book-M.E. Sharpe, 2001 ;
extremely informative too is Erwin Wickert (ed.),The Good German of Nanking : The Diaries
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(Connecticut)-London, Praeger, 2000. That doctoral dissertation is probably the most
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revisionist" Japanese historian lecturing in the United States, the large amounts of
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Singapore, Kelly & Walsh Limited, 1941.
10.An English (condensed) version exists : Honda Katsuichi, The Nanjing Massacre : A
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11.But that lack of ratification did not mean that Japan could exonerate itself from an
international law accepted by a majority of countries, that Japanese delegates
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12. Rabe's Diary, December 26th 1937, in Erwin Wickert (ed.), op. cit., p. 129.
13.Quoted in Yamamoto, op. cit., p. 97.
14.Ibid., p.108.
15.Ibid., p.120, note 45.
16.On that point as on many others, I strongly disagree with Iris Chang and the
numerous authors that followed her.
17.Actually estimated by another IC member to about 1,000.
18.John G. Magee, Diary, December 19th 1937, in Zhang, op. cit., p. 171.
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and Rural Survey, Shanghai, Mercury Press, 1938, Table 24 and Table 25.
20.See Nakajima's diary, January 23rd 1938, quoted in Yamamoto, op. cit., p. 159.
21.That attitude could fruitfully be compared with German action in Poland between
1939 and 1945. 
22.I allude to the protracted controversy on the killings near Mount Mufu. It would be
too long to develop.
23. Rabe's Diary, January 31st 1938, in Erwin Wickert (ed.), op. cit., p. 221.
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28.Even in more normal times, the Chinese army medical services were utterly
deficient. See Marvin Williamsen, “The Military Dimension, 1937-1941”, in James C.
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33.Bates, IMTFE, December 15th 1946, in Zhang, op. cit., p. 62.
34.Actually, due to the frequent occurrence of multiple killings of members of the same
families, the IC enquiries have given the figure of one family in five affected by at least
one murder or one injury inflicted by Japanese soldiers.
35.We should comment very briefly on the efforts recently made by several Chinese or
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300,000 mark by extending the area (and sometimes the period) of the Nanjing
massacre. Some want to consider not the city proper, even with its immediate vicinity,
but the whole municipal area (six counties)-but, in China, the major municipalities
include very large fully rural zones, as wide as some French régions. Some (like Honda)
even propose to consider the whole territory and period of the Nanjing military
campaign as a unit. As, in our present knowledge, it is impossible to get convincing
figures for such large areas, such methods may be considered as attempts to blur
hopelessly the debate. If the goal should be to get one day something like an undeniable
figure for war deaths over the whole of China (and who would not agree with that
goal ?), we need first to get figures for areas as small (and not as wide) as possible.
There is a long way to go, but there is no other route. Regarding Honda's otherwise
valuable enquiries, it is amazing that he frequently gives very precise―and often
convincing―figures for victims in villages or small towns, but rejects the very idea of
doing the same for Nanjing. Introducing in historical studies what can only be called
political or diplomatic considerations unfortunately offers much fuel to the most
dishonest of Japanese revisionists.
36.That part will be even sketchier than those preceding. We'll content ourselves with
presenting some interpretations that should still be made much more precise.
37.They should not be confused with the deniers. They admit that quite awful things
were done by Japanese in Nanjing, but they try to trivialise the facts, to systematically
lower the figures, to diminish the responsibilities and find excuses for the perpetrators.
38.See for example his Fallen soldiers : Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, Oxford,
Oxford University Press, 1990.
39.One exception is Toshio Iritani, Group Psychology of the Japanese in Wartime, London/
New York, Kegan Paul International, 1991.
40.John Dower, War without Mercy, New York, Pantheon, 1986.
41.Ueba diary, November 26th-27th 1937, quoted in Yamamoto, op. cit., p. 58.
42. Omer Bartov, L'armée d'Hitler, Paris, Hachette Littératures, 1999 (original English
edition : Hitler's army : Soldiers, nazis and war in the Third Reich, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1990), p. 190 and pp. 222-227.
43.The striking similarities between the Japanese and German militaries should raise
another, big question : is there a Japanese sonderweg (special way), in the very long
period, or were its apparent peculiarities connected to the specific characteristics of
the shorter 1868-1945 period ?
RÉSUMÉS
For Chinese of all origins and opinions, the wartime events of Nanjing have become a tragedy of
proportions equivalent to Hiroshima, if not Auschwitz. At the same time, there are still many
Japanese who try hard, if not to completely deny their army's crimes, at least to minimise them
and to find excuses for them. 
And yet,  for whoever bears the pain of  going back over the (copious)  evidence,  the process,
responsibilities and dimensions (including the fiercely debated number of victims) are not too
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difficult to draw, with a reasonable degree of precision. No other single massacre in Asian history
has had so many testifying witnesses. But the very centrality of Nanjing in the assessment of the
whole  1937-45  war  between  Japan  and  China  has  unfortunately  led  to  much  ideologically
motivated obscuring, on both sides.
Re-establishing the facts is a historian's first duty. Thus there was no indiscriminate massacre in
Nanjing, but the victimisation of different groups of Chinese in very different ways, with widely
differing results in terms of death rates. The killings were neither the result of a genocidal policy,
nor mere unpremeditated excesses. The role of Japan’s 1937 war strategy is here incriminated, as
is  the  country’s  drift  towards fascism.  The emergence of  new historical  approaches,  such as
analyses in terms of “war culture”, “brutalisation” or “violence of war”, will be also considered :
in that they could influence breakthroughs to a deeper understanding of a terrible tragedy.
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